In the Gaussian-modulated coherent state quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol, the sender first generates Gaussian distributed random numbers and then encodes them on weak laser pulses actively by performing amplitude and phase modulations. Recently, an equivalent passive QKD scheme was proposed by exploring the intrinsic field fluctuations of a thermal source [B. Qi, P. G. Evans, and W. P. Grice, Phys. Rev. A 97, 012317 (2018)]. This passive QKD scheme is especially appealing for chip-scale implementation since no active modulations are required. In this paper, we conduct an experimental study of the passively encoded QKD scheme using an off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emission source operated in continuous-wave mode. Our results show that the excess noise introduced by the passive state preparation scheme can be effectively suppressed by applying optical attenuation and secure key could be generated over metro-area distances. a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote users (Alice and Bob) to establish a secure key by transmitting quantum states through an untrusted channel [1] [2] [3] [4] . The generated secure key can be further applied in various cryptographic protocols to achieve long-term proven security against adversaries with unlimited computing power.
QKD protocols are commonly divided into two families based on encoding schemes: discrete-variable (DV) QKD or continuous-variable (CV) QKD. In contrast, classical optical communications protocols are typically grouped into two categories based on detection schemes: direct detection or coherent detection. In principle, combining both encoding (DV or CV) and detection (direct or coherent) could lead to four families of QKD protocols. Among them, DV QKD with direction detection (single photon detection) [5, 6] and CV-QKD with coherent detection (optical homodyne detection) [7] [8] [9] are dominant, although other protocols, such as CV-QKD using single * qib1@ornl.gov a This manuscript has been authored in part by UT-Battelle, LLC, under contract DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The US government retains and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the US government retains a nonexclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, worldwide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for US government purposes. DOE will provide public access to these results of federally sponsored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan (http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
photon detection [10] , do exist. For simplicity, in this paper we use the term CV-QKD to refer to CV-QKD using coherent detection.
Most distinguishing features of CV-QKD can be attributed to coherent detection: high speed optical homodyne detector with no dead time could significantly improve the secure key rate over short distances; the intrinsic filtering function provided by the local oscillator (LO) in a coherent receiver can effectively suppress background noise and enable QKD through conventional dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) fiber networks in the presence of strong classical traffic [11] [12] [13] ; the similarity between a CV-QKD system and a classical coherent communication system opens the door for simultaneous quantum and classical communications [14] with a technological pathway towards fully integrated, on-chip, photonic implementation [15] . Integrating CV QKD on a chip may have several benefits. It allows for the integration of multiple photonic operations into a single compact circuit. In particular, the phase-sensitive optical circuits commonly used for CV-QKD can be made more robust to temperature-induced phase drifts by reducing path-length differences on chip, which may be particularly beneficial for passive schemes. Furthermore, silicon photonic devices are compatible with complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) processes that enable monolithic integration of electronics and photonics, potentially leading to significant cost reductions and wide-spread utilization of QKD.
One important CV-QKD protocol is the Gaussianmodulated coherent states (GMCS) QKD protocol [9] , which has been implemented with standard off-the-shelf telecom components, such as laser sources, optical homo-arXiv:2001.06417v1 [quant-ph] 17 Jan 2020 dyne detectors, and optical intensity and phase modulators [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . In the GMCS protocol, Alice first generates Gaussian distributed random numbers x A and p A using a true random number generator (TRNG), and then prepares a coherent state |x A + ip A and sends it to Bob through a channel controlled by the adversary (Eve). The quantum state preparation is commonly implemented actively by modulating the output of a laser using amplitude and phase modulators. The requirement of high speed modulators with requisite high extinction ratio (ER) constitutes an important challenge in the chip-integration based on cost-effective silicon photonics technology. While on-chip modulatiors with ER above 65 dB have been demonstrated recently [21] , the high speed on-chip modulators required for active QKD encoding schemes adds significant cost, manufacturing time and complexity, and are the principal source of loss in most integrated photonic circuits. Therefore, the potential to remove the modulators used for encoding may yield significant reductions in cost, manufacturing time, and on-chip loss.
One can simplify the chip-scale CV-QKD scheme by replacing the amplitude and phase modulators used in GMCS QKD with a thermal source, beam splitters, optical attenuators and homodyne detectors [22] . As we have shown in [22] , given Alice's QKD transmitter is completely trusted, the passive CV-QKD protocol is equivalent to the GMCS QKD. This means that the wellestablished security proofs for the GMCS QKD can be applied to the passive CV-QKD directly. More recently, this passive state preparation scheme has been extended to measurement-device-independent CV QKD [23] . It could also be applied in other CV quantum communication protocols, such as quantum secret sharing [24] and quantum digital signature [25] .
In this paper, we conduct experimental studies of the passive CV-QKD using a practical multi-mode thermal source. As we show below, the excess noise due to the multi-mode nature of the source can be effectively suppressed by applying optical attenuation at Alice's end, and secure key could be generated over practical distances using an off-the-shelf amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) source operated in continuous-wave (cw) mode.
This paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, we review the passive CV-QKD protocol and compare it with the conventional GMCS QKD [9, 26] as well as entanglement-based CV QKD using a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state [27] . In Sec. III, we present our experimental setup and develop a corresponding noise model. In Sec. IV, we present the experimental results. Finally, we conclude this paper with a brief summary in Sec. V. [9] . TRNG, true random number generator; A&P mod., amplitude and phase modulators. (b) Entanglement-based CV-QKD [27] . TMSV, two-mode squeezed vacuum state; HOM, homodyne detector; BS, beam splitter. (c) Passive CV-QKD [22] . Att., optical attenuator.
II. THE PROTOCOL AND ITS SECURITY
In the GMCS QKD protocol [9] , Alice prepares a Gaussian-modulated coherent state |x A + ip A and sends it to Bob, as shown in Fig. 1(a) . In the ideal case, Alice's uncertainty on either quadrature of the outgoing mode is equal to one in the shot-noise unit (SNU), as determined by the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics. From Eve's point of view, the quantum state from Alice is a mixture of all possible coherent states, which is simply a thermal state with an average photon number of V A /2, where V A is Alice's modulation variance in SNU. Note in this paper all the noise variances and modulation variances are defined in SNU.
There are different ways (corresponding to different QKD protocols) for Alice to prepare the outgoing thermal state. As long as Alice's QKD transmitter is within a secure space, Eve cannot tell which protocol is actually carried out by Alice. This suggests all these QKD protocols are equivalent. In fact, the security of the GMCS QKD can be analyzed based on an entanglement-based protocol employing a TMSV state [27] , as shown in Fig.  1(b) . By performing conjugate homodyne detection on one mode of the TMSV state, Alice acquires Gaussian distributed random numbers x A and p A , whose variance can be set to a desired value V A by choosing a suitable TMSV state. In the meantime, the other mode of the TMSV state is projected to a coherent state |x A + ip A and can be sent to Bob. From Eve's point of view, since she has no information about x A and p A , the state from Alice is thermal, as in the case of the GMCS QKD. Note that conjugate homodyne detection can be implemented by using a balanced beam splitter followed by two homodyne detectors with a 90-degree phase difference between the two LOs.
In the passive CV-QKD scheme proposed in [22] , a thermal source is applied directly to generate the outgoing thermal state, as shown in Fig. 1 (c). In this protocol, Alice splits the output of a thermal source into two spatial modes using a balanced beam splitter. One mode is sent to Bob after being "optically" attenuated by a factor of η 0 using an optical attenuator, while the other mode will be measured locally be Alice using conjugate homodyne detection. Alice further numerically scales down her measurement results by a factor of √ η 0 to acquire Gaussian-distributed random numbers x A and p A , as her estimations of the quadrature values of the outgoing mode. As noted in [22] , the combination of the balanced beam splitter and the optical attenuator in Fig.  1 (c) can be replaced by a single unbalanced beam splitter with a suitable splitting ratio. The latter can lead to a more efficient use of the thermal source. The rest of the steps in the above three QKD protocols are identical. More specifically, Bob either measures a randomly chosen quadrature of the received quantum state by conducting single homodyne detection [9] or measures both quadrature simultaneously by conducting conjugate homodyne detection [26] . Alice and Bob further estimate channel-induced noise and other QKD parameters by comparing a subset of their data through an authenticated classical channel. This allows them to upper bound the information that could be gained by Eve using the well-established security proofs of the GMCS QKD. Given Alice and Bob share more information than obtained by Eve, they can perform reconciliation and privacy amplification to generate a secure key. More details about the GMCS QKD can be found in recently reviews [28, 29] .
While the security of QKD is not dependent on which of the above schemes is employed, the secure key rate is highly sensitive to the excess noise (the noise above the shot noise) generated in the quantum state preparation process. In the passive QKD scheme, given Alice's local measurement results, her uncertainty on the X quadrature of the outgoing mode (conditional noise variance) is given by [22] 
where η 0 is the transmittance of the optical attenuator, η ax and υ ax are the efficiency and noise variance of Alice's homodyne detector for X-quadrature measurement. The same analysis can also be applied to the P quadrature. From Eq. (1), if no optical attention is applied on the outgoing mode (η 0 = 1), even with a perfect detector (η ax = 1 and υ ax = 0), the excess noise contributed by Alice (which equals to ∆−1) is one in SNU. If we assume this excess noise is due to Eve's attack, no secure key can be generated [30] . To suppress the excess noise, an optical attenuator is introduced in Fig. 1(c) . Equation (1) suggests that regardless the amount of detector noise, as η 0 approaches zero, so does the excess noise. This is convenient in practice since Alice's detector does not need to be shot-noise limited.
In practice, η 0 cannot be zero, otherwise, to have nonzero average photon number in the outgoing mode, the average photon number of the thermal source has to be infinite. With a non-zero η 0 , the excess noise due to Alice is given by 2η0
). The information gained by Eve can be upper bounded from the amount of total excess noise in QKD and other system parameters using the security proofs of QKD. The higher the excess noise, the more the information Eve could gain, and thus more raw keys will be sacrificed in the post-processing of QKD to extract the final secure key. In next section, we will present our experimental setup, develop a corresponding noise model, and quantify the QKD performance.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND NOISE MODEL
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2 . A fiber amplifier (PriTel, Inc.) operated in cw mode (ASE in Fig. 2 ) with vacuum state input is employed as a broadband thermal source. Previous studies have shown that the ASE noise generated by a fiber amplifier is thermal [22, [32] [33] [34] . To select out a single polarization mode, a fiber pigtailed polarizer (Pol in Fig. 2 ) is placed right after the ASE source. A 0.8 nm optical bandpass filter centered at 1542 nm (BP in Fig. 2) is also employed to reduce the power of unused light. Note the actual bandwidth of this filter is not crucial since the optical coherent detection is mode selective: only photons in the same spectral-temporal and polarization mode as the LO will be detected. Nevertheless, the optical power of unused modes should be suppressed to be well below the power of the LO.
The filtered thermal light is split by a balanced beam splitter into two modes: mod 1 is sent to Bob after passing through an optical attenuator while mod 2 is measured locally by Alice using conjugate homodyne detection (see also Fig. 3 ). Note there are two optical attenuators shown in Fig. 2 : Att1 represents a "trusted" attenuator inside Alice's system which cannot be controlled by Eve. It provides the desired attenuation η 0 shown in Eq. (1); Att2 represents the channel loss which is fully controlled by Eve. In this proof-of-principle experiment, a single optical attenuator is employed to provide the combined attenuation of Att1 and Att2.
A cw laser source with a central wavelength of 1542 nm (Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wavelength Reference) is employed to provide LOs for both Alice and Bob's conjugate homodyne detection system. For long distance application, instead of transmitting a LO from Alice to Bob, it is more appropriate to generate Bob's LO locally [35] [36] [37] . The conjugate homodyne detection is implemented using a 90-degree optical hybrid and two balanced photodetectors. Limited by the detectors available, different types of balanced photodetectors are employed in Alice's and Bob's systems. The corresponding bandwidths are 100MHz (Alice) and 75MHz (Bob). The outputs of all the balanced photodetectors are sampled by a real time oscilloscope.
One important deviation of the setup shown in Fig. 2 from the ideal passive QKD protocol discussed in the previous Section is that a multi-mode (rather than a single mode) thermal state is employed in the actual experiment. On one hand, this modification greatly simplifies the implementation since it is experimentally challenging to prepare a single mode thermal state; on the other hand, the existence of unused modes could contribute additional noise, as we will discuss below.
Within the integration time of the homodyne detector, the output of the ASE source (even after the 0.8 nm spectral filter) contains many spectral-temporal modes of independent thermal states. To generate correlated keys, Alice and Bob should measure the same mode. In practice, the modes measured by Alice and Bob (which are determined by the modes of their LOs) may not be perfectly overlapped. We define the mode measured by Bob as mode |B . The mode measured by Alice may be decomposed as where |B represents mode orthogonal to mode |B , and |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume the mode overlap coefficient a is a real number.
For simplicity, we only consider the X-quadrature below. The P-quadrature can be studied in a similar way. The X-quadrature of the outgoing mode (see Fig. 3 ) is given by
where x in is the X-quadrature of mode |B of the source, η 0 is the transmittance of the optical attenuator, and x v1 represents vacuum noise introduced by the beam splitter and the attenuator. Similarly, Alice's measurement result of X-quadrature is given by
where x in is the X-quadrature of mode |B of the source, E 2 ax = υ ax is the noise in Alice's X-quadrature measurement. x v2 represents vacuum noise due to the two 50:50 beam splitters and the loss of detector.
Alice can estimate x 1 from her measurement result x 2 using
Using Eqs. (3) to (5), Alice's uncertainty on x 1 can be determined to be
Here we use ∆ M to distinguish with the uncertainty in the single mode case as given in Eq. (1). In the derivation of Eq. (6), we use the relation (x in ) 2 = (2n 0 + 1)N 0 , where n 0 is average output photon number from the ASE source in mode |B , N 0 = 1/4 is shot noise. It is easy to show that when a = 1, Eq. (6) reduces to Eq. (1).
If the source outputs a single mode thermal state in mode |B , then n 0 in Eq. (6) becomes zero. Comparing with Eq. (1), the impact of mode-mismatch in the single mode thermal state case is equivalent to a reduction of detection efficiency by a factor of a 2 , which could be compensated by reducing η 0 . Since the equivalent modulation variance of the outgoing mode is given by V A = η 0 n 0 , to maintain V A at a desired value, the average photon number n 0 in mode |B should be increased proportionally.
In our experiment, the output of the ASE source contains many modes and it is reasonable to assume that modes |B and |B are equally populated, i.e., n 0 = n 0 . Using V A = η 0 n 0 , Eq. (6) becomes
Note the term 1−a 2 a 2 V A cannot be compressed by reducing η 0 . The excess noise due to the passive state preparation scheme is ε A = ∆ M − 1, which can be determined from (7) as
Once the excess noise of QKD has been appropriately quantified, we can apply the standard security proof of the GMCS QKD to calculate the secure key rate. In next section, we will experimentally determine the mode mismatch a and other system parameters and evaluate the performance of our system.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the experiment, both the ASE source and the LO are operated in cw mode. A 2GHz bandwidth real time oscilloscope is employed to sample the outputs of Alice and Bob's detectors. The modes sampled by Alice and Bob are determined by lengths of optical paths and also the electrical frequency responses of optical homodyne detectors. Due to experimental imperfections, the modes measured by Alice and Bob are not perfectly overlapped, i.e., a < 1. To determine a, we calculate the correlation between Alice and Bob's measurement results at different output photon numbers from the ASE source.
Alice's X-quadrature measurement result x 2 is given by Eq. (4) . Similarly, Bob's X-quadrature measurement results x 3 is given by (when no optical attenuation applied)
where η bx is the detection efficiency in Bob's Xquadrature measurement, and E 2 bx = υ bx is the corresponding noise variance.
Using Eqs. (4) and (9) , it is easy to show
FIG. 4: Raw data of Alice and Bob's X-quadrature measurement results (n 0 =880 and no optical attenuation applied)
From Eqs. (10)- (12) , the correlation coefficient between x 2 and x 3 is given by
Eq. (13) shows that as n 0 approaches infinity, the correlation coefficient approaches the mode overlap coefficient a. Thus, we can determine a experimentally by measuring the correlation between Alice and Bob's measurement results at high output photon number of the source.
We adjust n 0 by changing the pump power of the ASE source and calculate the correlation coefficient from experimental data. In this experiment, no optical attention is applied. The LO power is 2 mW. The detection efficiency and noise variance of Alice and Bob's conjugate homodyne detectors are η ax = 0.43 ± 0.01, η ap = 0.38 ± 0.01, η bx = 0.54 ± 0.01, η bp = 0.51 ± 0.01, υ ax = 0.17 ± 0.01, υ ap = 0.19 ± 0.01, υ bx = 0.24 ± 0.01, υ ap = 0.23 ± 0.01. Fig. 4 shows the raw data of Alice and Bob's X-quadrature measurement results when the average photon number per mode from the source is n 0 = 880. Fig. 5 shows the correlation coefficient of Alice and Bob's X-quadrature measurement results at different n 0 . The red line is a curve fit using Eq. (13) with a = 0.96 and detector parameters given above. The theory and experimental results match well.
To further justify the above noise model we conduct experiments using a constant n 0 of 900 and different optical attenuation η 0 . This experiment can also be modeled using Eq. (13), with η bx replaced by η 0 η bx . Note that when the optical loss is very high, the correlation between Alice and Bob's data is barely visible from the raw data, as evidenced by the case of η 0 = −42.2dB shown in Fig.  6 . Nevertheless, by calculating the correlation coefficient from the raw data and comparing it with the theoretical prediction, the proposed noise model is well justified, as shown in Fig. 7 .
As we have shown in [22] , the well-established security proof of the GMCS QKD can be applied to passive CV-QKD, as long as the excess noise due to Alice is properly quantified using Eq. (8) . We calculate the secure key as a function of the channel length using experimentally determined system parameters. Here, we assume the quantum channel is single mode fiber with an attenuation coefficient of γ = 0.2dB/km. As shown in Fig.  8 , a practical distance about 70km could be achieved. The QKD distance could be further extended by improving the mode overlap factor a. Details of the secure key formulas are summarized in Appendix A.
V. SUMMARY
One common question is whether we can trust the randomness from a thermal source. It is a common practice to apply a quantum random number generator (QRNG) [38, 39] in prepare-and-measure QKD for state prepara- tion and/or measurement basis selection. As we have discussed in [34] , while quantum randomness is ultimately connected to quantum superposition states, in the fully trusted device scenario, the quantum state received by the detector does not need to be a pure state. One illustrative example is the first generation QRNG, where electrons from a radioactive source such as 90 Sr are detected by a Geiger Mueller tube at random times [40, 41] . In this process, while the whole system (the radioactive nuclei and electrons) is in pure state, the state received by the detector is a mixture of 0-electron and 1-electron emission states. True randomness can be generated as long as Eve cannot access (or control) the radioactive source. Similar arguments can also be applied to random number generators based on thermal states or phase randomized coherent states generated through spontaneous emission processes.
The security of QKD is only as good as its underlying assumptions [42] . In this paper, we have adopted a commonly used assumption in QKD that the QKD systems employed by Alice and Bob are fully trusted and cannot be accessed by Eve. In practice, any real-life QKD systems cannot be perfect. It is thus important to scrutinize all the implementation details to identify potential side channels and develop the corresponding countermeasures. The investigation of loopholes and countermeasures in practical QKD systems plays a complementary role to security proofs.
In summary, we conduct experimental studies on the recently proposed passive CV-QKD protocol [22] , which is appealing for chip-scale implementation. When implemented with a practical multi-mode thermal source, one important issue is how to determine the excess noise contributed by photons in the unwanted modes. In this paper, we develop a noise model based on a practical setup, and conduct experiments to verify the above model using a commercial off-the-shelf ASE source. Our results suggest that passive CV-QKD could be a cost-effective solution for metro-size QKD.
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where I AB is the Shannon mutual information between Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation algorithm; χ BE is the Holevo bound on information between Eve and Bob. For an optical fiber link with an attenuation coefficient of γ, the channel transmittance is given by
where L is the fiber length in kilometers.
In the case of conjugate homodyne detection, the Xquadrature noise added by Bob's detector (referred to Bob's input) is given by [43] χ het = [1 + (1 − η bx ) + 2υ bx ]/η bx .
(A3)
The channel-added noise (referred to the channel input) is given by
where ε A is defined in Eq. (8) in the main text. The overall noise referred to the channel input is given by
Since both quadratures can be used to generate secure key, the mutual information between Alice and Bob can be determined by
where V = V A + 1.
To estimate χ BE , we assumet that Eve cannot control the impefections in Bob's system. This noise model has been widely used in CV-QKD experiments [9, 12, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Under this model, the Holevo bound of the information between Eve and Bob is given by [16] 
where G(x) = (x + 1)log 2 (x + 1) − xlog 2 x.
where
where C = 1 (T (V + χ tot )) 2 [Aχ 2 het + B + 1 + 2χ het
(A13)
